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In this paper we review studies that investigated tool use disorders in left-brain damaged
(LBD) patients over the last 30 years. Four tasks are classically used in the field of apraxia:
Pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use and mechanical problem solving.
Our aim was to address two issues, namely, (1) the role of mechanical knowledge in
real tool use and (2) the cognitive mechanisms underlying pantomime of tool use, a task
widely employed by clinicians and researchers. To do so, we extracted data from 36 papers
and computed the difference between healthy subjects and LBD patients. On the whole,
pantomime of tool use is the most difficult task and real tool use is the easiest one.
Moreover, associations seem to appear between pantomime of tool use, real tool use and
mechanical problem solving. These results suggest that the loss of mechanical knowledge
is critical in LBD patients, even if all of those tasks (and particularly pantomime of tool use)
might put differential demands on semantic memory and working memory.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, a body of evidence has indicated that
lesions in the left hemisphere can impair the ability to use
tools, hereafter referred to as “apraxia of tool use.” Nevertheless,
there is neither consensus on the underlying cognitive processes
(semantic knowledge about tool function, sensorimotor knowl-
edge about tool manipulation, mechanical knowledge), nor on
the way they are assessed (pantomime of tool use, single tool use,
real tool use, mechanical problem solving). So, it may be difficult
for students and researchers to obtain a comprehensive overview
of tool use impairments after left brain damage. The major aim
of this paper is to fill this gap by providing a synthesis of experi-
mental results over the last 30 years. This will lead us to address
two crucial issues: (1) The role of mechanical knowledge in tool
use, which has received growing attention in recent years; (2) The
cognitive processes supporting the most widely employed task,
namely, pantomime of tool use.
Before discussing these issues directly, let us specify which
studies are eligible for inclusion in the present review. Apraxia
covers a wide range of disorders (e.g., constructive apraxia, gait
apraxia, apraxia of speech, dressing apraxia) as well as sev-
eral types of gestures (tool use, symbolic and meaningless ges-
tures). However, we will only emphasize tool use impairment.
Besides, the historical ideomotor/ideational apraxia dichotomy
has been argued to be confusing, reflecting either a task-based
or a process-based distinction (e.g., Hermsdörfer et al., 2006;
Osiurak et al., 2011; Lesourd et al., 2013a). Therefore, for the
sake of clarity, we decided not to use this dissociation to select
studies.
TOOL USE ASSESSMENT
Apraxia of tool use can be assessed in at least four ways depending
on the amount of information given to patients.
PANTOMIME OF TOOL USE
Critical to this task is that patients are asked to demonstrate the
use of tools without holding them in hand. The input modal-
ity may vary (visual presentation of the tool, verbal command,
imitation) and the examiner may provide more or less infor-
mation as to the name of the tool, its function, its usual cor-
responding object1 or the necessity of imagining holding the
tool in hand. Imitation tasks can be performed without refer-
ring to tool knowledge, as in imitation of meaningless pos-
tures (Della Sala et al., 2006; see also Goldenberg, 1995, 1999;
Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997). Therefore, we did not con-
sider results about imitation and we only included studies on
pantomime of tool use on visual presentation and/or to verbal
command.
1We shall use the terms tool and object to refer to the implement perform-
ing the action (e.g., screwdriver) and the recipient of the action (e.g., screw),
respectively.
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SINGLE TOOL USE
Single tool use consists in demonstrating the use of a tool while
holding it in hand but without the usual, corresponding object.
Contrary to pantomimes, the tactile input is present, suggesting
that patients do not need to form a mental representation of the
tool. Additional information may be provided (name of the tool,
the action or the goal of the action) but, for our purpose, we did
not take these criteria into account.
REAL TOOL USE
In this task, patients are asked to actually use tools with the
usual, corresponding object. We distinguished between two con-
ditions (no-choice versus choice). In the no-choice condition,
patients are presented with only the tool and its corresponding
object. In the choice condition, several tools and objects are given.
Two criteria can be found in the literature, namely, the pres-
ence/absence of tools/objects not useful for the action to be done
(i.e., distractors) or the presence/absence of a sequence of at least
two actions involving more than two tools/objects (i.e., multiple
object task). This latter condition can be viewed as a choice condi-
tion since each time an action is performed with two tools/objects
(e.g., striking the match on the matchbox), the remaining
tools/objects (e.g., the candle) become distractors for this specific
action.
MECHANICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
These tasks require using novel tools in order to solve an unfa-
miliar tool use situation (e.g., extracting a target from a box or
lifting a cylinder). The solution can be found out from the mere
observation of the device, perhaps without adopting trial-and-
error strategy. This covers situations wherein familiar tools have
to be used in a non-conventional way (e.g., screwing a screw with
a knife). As for real tool use, two conditions exist: choice (i.e.,
selection of the correct tools among an array of novel tools) and
no-choice (i.e., only the correct, novel tool is present).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
It is commonly assumed that tool use is supported by two sys-
tems: The conceptual and the production system. The role of the
conceptual system is to form a mental, tool action representation.
Three kinds of knowledge have been proposed in the literature.
The first one corresponds to semantic knowledge about tool func-
tion, which contains information about the usual relationship
between a familiar tool and its corresponding object or the con-
text wherein it can be used (e.g., a hammer is commonly used
with a nail and can be found in a workshop; Roy and Square,
1985; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001). In other words, it refers
to allocentric relationships (i.e., tool-object), and is associated
with left anterior, temporal lobe lesions (Hodges et al., 2000;
Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009; Goldenberg, 2013a).
Second, sensorimotor knowledge about tool manipulation
comprises information about the movements associated with the
usual manipulation of a specific tool (e.g., the use of a hammer
requires ample elbow oscillations; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum,
2001). So, contrary to semantic knowledge, sensorimotor knowl-
edge is supposed to encode egocentric relationships (i.e., tool-
user). Damage to the left inferior parietal lobe might impair this
kind of knowledge (e.g., Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum
and Kalénine, 2010; Kalénine et al., 2013).
Third, mechanical knowledge provides information about
relationships between the physical properties of tools and objects
(e.g., hammering requires that the hammer is heavier than the
nail; Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998b; Goldenberg and Spatt,
2009; Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Osiurak, 2014). This kind
of knowledge refers to allocentric relationships (i.e., tool-object)
and might be also supported by the left inferior parietal lobe
(Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009).
The role of the production system is to generate a specific
movement pattern by taking into account both the environmen-
tal constraints and the tool action representation built by the
conceptual system (for discussion, see Osiurak, 2013a,b). The
dorsal stream would be the neural basis of this production system
(Heilman et al., 1986; Buxbaum, 2001; Binkofski and Buxbaum,
2013).
The aforementioned kinds of knowledge have been suggested
to be differentially involved depending on the given task (pan-
tomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use, mechanical
problem solving). Special attention has to be paid to pantomime
of tool use given that it might be grounded on processes that
are not tool-specific. Indeed, the most widespread interpretation
of impaired performance in this task stresses damage to sensori-
motor knowledge (i.e., the sensorimotor knowledge hypothesis;
Heilman et al., 1982; Buxbaum et al., 2005). However, it has also
been hypothesized that it is a non-routine, creative task requiring
working memory in order to temporarily maintain information
about how the tool has to be held in hand and should be used
with the corresponding, absent object (i.e., the working memory
hypothesis; Roy and Hall, 1992; Bartolo et al., 2003). At last, pan-
tomime of tool use has been assumed to be nothing else but a kind
of symbolic gesture (i.e., the symbolic hypothesis; Goldenberg
et al., 2003). In this view, the demonstration by pantomime would
aim to communicate the idea of the action rather than to attempt
to reproduce the gesture strictly speaking. We shall return to these
three hypotheses in more detail below.
METHODS
The purpose of the present paper was to review the experimen-
tal data published on pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real
tool use and mechanical problem solving since 1985 (i.e., the year
Roy and Square published the conception-production model).
To this end, several databases (i.e., PubMed, ScienceDirect, Eric,
Francis, PBSC, Psycarticles, Web of Knowledge) were searched in
2013–2014 for the following keywords: “tool use,” “object use,”
“apraxia,” “limb apraxia,” “ideational apraxia,” “apraxia of tool
use,” and “stroke,” “left brain damage,” “left hemisphere.”
SELECTION OF PAPERS
Only English language experimental studies were included. They
had to meet the following criteria:
(1) Presence of right-handed patients with lesions confined to the
left hemisphere. Studies were not included if they involved
healthy subjects only or if they investigated disconnection
syndromes.
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(2) Presence of a control group consisting of healthy subjects or at
least non-neurological patients.
(3) Administration of at least one of the four critical tasks (i.e.,
pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use, mechan-
ical problem solving). Pantomime tasks had to be made of
“pure” pantomime items, without other types of items such
as symbolic gestures (e.g., waving goodbye). Besides, tasks
were considered as mechanical problem solving tasks only if
patients had to hold a tool to use with an object, and only if
it could be achieved through inference rather than trial and
error, so as to be comparable with other tool use tasks.
(4) Administration on verbal command, visual presentation or tac-
tile input. Even though the aforementioned tasks can be
administered on imitation, we did not consider this modal-
ity because imitation is not supposed to be accounted for
by semantic knowledge about tool function, sensorimotor
knowledge about tool manipulation or mechanical knowl-
edge (see Roy and Square, 1985; Rothi et al., 1991). Moreover,
there is no consistent correlation between production of sym-
bolic gestures on verbal command and on imitation (Heath
et al., 2001). Therefore, we focused on verbal, visual and tac-
tile presentation of tools or objects. It is noteworthy that
we could have studied modality effects, but we did not do
so. Because of methodological heterogeneity in the field of
apraxia, this would have led us to generate too many cate-
gories with very few studies for each modality, preventing us
from drawing firm conclusions.
(5) Availability of quantitative behavioral data for both patients
and controls, allowing us to convert mean performance lev-
els into percentages, and to contrast them. Frequency of
impairment among patients, z-scores, number of errors, and
kinematic data were not taken into account. Finally, we
excluded “redundant” studies (i.e., studies whose data had
already been published) for it would have exaggerated some
results.
Our keywords led us to create a corpus of 176 studies. Only 36
out of 176 studies fitted our criteria (see Figure 1). In this pool
we counted 59 different tasks, considering that several studies
included more than one relevant task. Regarding our criteria,
tool use is frequently assessed through pantomime of tool use
(25/36, 69%) whereas single tool use (12/36, 33%), real tool use
(14/36, 39%) and especially mechanical problem solving (8/36,
22%) were only occasionally investigated over the last 30 years.
This can be explained by a lack of consensus in this field (see
Dovern et al., 2012).
DATA EXTRACTION
In many papers only apraxic left-brain damaged (LBD) patients
are included, most often on the basis of imitation or pantomime
tasks. However, although some manifestations of apraxia are
more prevalent following left rather than right hemisphere lesions
(Goldenberg, 2009), this is not the case for real tool use and nat-
uralistic actions (Schwartz et al., 1999; Hartmann et al., 2005;
Rumiati, 2005). We did not select these studies because our pur-
pose was to analyze the consequences of left-brain-damage, rather
than apraxia, on tool use. Indeed, if we did so, this would have
led us to follow a pointless, circular reasoning, namely, apraxic
patients are apraxic. Nevertheless, we reviewed these studies if
they secondarily included non-apraxic LBD patients. In this case,
we calculated the mean performance of apraxic and non-apraxic
LBD patients (by taking into consideration, of course, the num-
ber of patients in each category). We acknowledge that this may
be a bias since it does not display the performances of consecutive
patients. However we believe it reflects the state of literature, and
it prevented us from eliminating too many relevant studies.
DATA ANALYSIS
In order to make data from these 36 studies comparable, we
converted mean performances and standard deviations into per-
centages. Then, we calculated the mean performance level for
each task, weighted by sample sizes. Furthermore, for each study,
we computed the difference between controls’ scores minus LBD
patients’ scores (for a similar method, see Lesourd et al., 2013a,b).
This procedure appears suitable for several reasons. First, given
the low number of studies available and methodological hetero-
geneity, it was not relevant to conduct a meta-analysis. Second,
the performances of control subjects can vary between studies,
therefore focusing on differences rather than raw scores avoids
a bias when comparing papers. At last, this procedure expresses
the severity of the impairment in each task, which is a good way
to determine whether different tasks call upon similar or differ-
ent cognitive mechanisms (e.g., a difference of 50% in one task
and 10% in another may lead us to infer divergent cognitive
FIGURE 1 | Repartition of the 36 studies included in the present review over time.
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demands). However, results from this procedure have to be taken
with caution in light of the high frequency of ceiling effects in
control groups, which can artificially reduce the difference to
patients.
RESULTS
COMPARISONS BASED ONWEIGHTED MEANS
As can be seen in Table 1, performance of LBD patients is lower
for pantomime of tool use than for single and real tool use (mean
scores 66, 78, 84%, respectively; range 34–88, 68–100, 72–100),
with the two latter producing similar results at first sight. Actually,
in terms of level of performance, pantomime of tool use is closer
to mechanical problem solving (mean score 68%, range 30–94),
than to other conditions.
COMPARISONS BASED ON GROUP DIFFERENCES
Control-patient differences are presented in Figure 2 (raw scores
are displayed in Table 1). Each circle corresponds to one task in
one study. The Y-axis displays the distance in percentage between
control subjects and LBD patients: The greater the difference, the
Table 1 | Performances of control subjects and LBD patients (mean scores and standard deviations).
Patients (n) Pantomime of Single tool use Real tool use Mechanical problem
tool use solving
NOR LBD NOR LBD NOR LBD NOR LBD
Flores-Medina et al., 2014 17 85 (2) 45 (5) – – – – – –
Hermsdörfer et al., 2013 23 – – 99 (1) 71 (27) – – – –
Jarry et al., 2013 16 87 (11) 47 (36) 93 (9) 72 (27) 98,8 (3) 76 (29) 92 (10) 58 (33)
Bickerton et al., 2012 74 – – – – 96 (7) 80 (32) – –
Hogrefe et al., 2012 24 92 (7) 69 (27) – – – – – –
Poole et al., 2011 30 – – – – 88 (8) 76 (7) – –
Papeo et al., 2011 12 – – 96 (1) 85 (4) – – – –
Randerath et al., 2011 25 100 (7) 75 (34) 100 (0) 88 (16) 100 (0) 100 (2) – –
Randerath et al., 2010 42 – – 100 (0) 79 (19) – – – –
Stamenova et al., 2010 42 95 (1) 71 (4) – – – – – –
Vanbellingen et al., 2010 84 88 (12) 58 (32) – – – – – –
Dawson et al., 2010 6 95 (5) 85 (10) – – – – – –
Jacobs et al., 2009 18 – – 94 (4) 69 (28) – – – –
Osiurak et al., 2009 20 – – – – 100 (2) 89 (19) 85 (7) 64 (20)
Lunardelli et al., 2008 30 – – – – – – 45 (24) 30 (17)
Osiurak et al., 2008 16 93 (6) 71 (30) – – 99 (2) 92 (14) – –
Goldenberg et al., 2007* 11 93 80 – – 95 83 100 94
Bartolo et al., 2007 5 92 (4) 44 (33) – – 91 (7) 74 (12) 98 (3) 81 (19)
Jax et al., 2006 15 91 (6) 81 (13) – – – – – –
Buxbaum et al., 2005 13 89 (1) 71 (19) – – – – – –
Hartmann et al., 2005 25 93 (1) 66 (5) – – 92 (2) 83 (3) 99 (1) 88 (3)
Goldenberg et al., 2003 40 96 (3) 66 (27) – – – – – –
Bartolo et al., 2003 1 97 (5) 60 100 (0) 100 – – – –
Halsband et al., 2001 13 98 80 – – 100 98 – –
Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2001 14 85 41 – – – – – –
Neiman et al., 2000 30 – – – – 98 78 – –
Cubelli et al., 2000 19 – – 93 72 (28) – – – –
Roy et al., 2000 46 93 (3) 87 (8) – – – – – –
Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998b 42 84 50 – – 99 92 100 85
Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998a 35 86 (11) 34 (32) 99 (3) 78 (21) – – – –
Roy et al., 1998 26 95 (3) 88 (4) – – – – – –
Heilman et al., 1997 21 86 (23) 56 (27) 94 (12) 68 (23) 100 (0) 83 (17) 82 (17) 57 (25)
Schnider et al., 1997 16 98 (2) 78 (21) 100 (0) 93 (10) – – – –
Belanger and Duffy, 1996 25 91 (5) 71 (14) 90 (3) 77 (12) – – – –
Foundas et al., 1995 10 – – – – 100 (0) 72 (22) – –
Barbieri and De Renzi, 1988 56 97 (4) 76 (23) – – – – – –
Weighted mean 92 66 97 77 97 84 85 68
Minimum mean score 84 34 90 68 88 72 45 30
Maximum mean score 100 88 100 100 100 100 100 94
*We included this paper although some data have already been published in a larger sample (Hartmann et al., 2005).
Bolded values are non-significant differences.
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FIGURE 2 | Differences (in percentage) between control subjects and
LBD patients: pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool
use and mechanical problem solving. Colored circles correspond to
studies that investigated more than one task. Circles in bold are
non-significant differences. Curves were drawn for studies that
investigated the four tasks.
higher the impairment. Colors were assigned to some circles in
order to stress studies in which two, three or four tasks were
administered. Gray circles represent studies that investigated only
one of the four tasks. Circles in bold are non-significant differ-
ences. Circle surfaces express sample sizes and curves were drawn
for the only two studies that investigated all of the four tasks
(Heilman et al., 1997; Jarry et al., 2013).
At first sight, there is more discrepancy between studies con-
cerning pantomime of tool use, and there is a gradient from
pantomime of tool use (mean difference 25%, range 6–52) to
real tool use (mean 13%, range 0–28) with single tool use being
intermediary (mean 17%, range 0–28). Actually, the first is sys-
tematically more difficult than the two latter if we focus on studies
in which at least two tasks were administered (i.e., colored circles
in Figure 2).
Second, this gradient is less obvious between single and real
tool use. Although previous studies found no significant asso-
ciation between these tasks (Butler, 2002; Bickerton et al., 2012;
see also Riddoch et al., 1989), only two studies investigated both
of these tasks in respect of our criteria: According to Jarry et al.
(2013), both of them are equally difficult whereas Randerath et al.
(2011) found real tool use to be much easier. This gap is most
likely due to methodological variations since the latter authors
employed a very structured task (i.e., patients were assessed with
only two items, they did not have to select tools in real tool use
and they were provided with verbal information about the action
to be done).
Finally mechanical problem solving appears to be the most
difficult task after pantomime of tool use (mean difference
18%, range 6–34). More specifically, the control-patient differ-
ence is almost always greater than in single and/or real tool
use. Only one out of eight studies reported the opposite finding
in LBD patients with posterior lesions only (Goldenberg et al.,
2007). Nevertheless, real tool use and mechanical problem solv-
ing are assessed with a wide array of tasks. In light of these
results, it appeared necessary to control for this methodological
discrepancy.
EFFECT OF CHOICE AND DISTRACTORS IN REAL TOOL USE AND
MECHANICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
We divided data from real tool use and mechanical problem solv-
ing into two categories: In the no-choice condition, patients are
presented with only one tool and its corresponding object (e.g.,
a match and a matchbox) whereas in the choice condition, they
are presented with three or more tools/objects (e.g., a match, a
matchbox and a candle; also referred as to multiple object tasks).
Within this latter condition, studies were also distinguished by
the presence/absence of distractors, defined as tools/objects not
useful for the task to be done (e.g., a match, a matchbox and
a hammer). Situations in which at least two tasks are presented
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simultaneously (e.g., making coffee, fixing a tape recorder) were
judged to include distractors since tools that are useful for one
task are useless for the other.
As can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3, only two studies inves-
tigated both choice and no choice in both real tool use and
mechanical problem solving (Heilman et al., 1997; Jarry et al.,
2013). Overall, although mechanical problem solving is more dif-
ficult than real tool use, these tasks produce similar results in that
reducing the number of tools/objects enhances performances in
both conditions. The only study that investigated real tool use
(choice) without distractors (Neiman et al., 2000) found similar
results.
Finally, as shown in Table 3, pantomime of tool use is more
difficult than single tool use, which is more difficult than real
tool use (no choice), with choice conditions being intermediary
between pantomime of tool use and single tool use. Nevertheless,
it is noteworthy that even in no choice condition, LBD patients’
performance is significantly impaired as compared to controls.
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN TASKS
We intended to determine whether associations can be found
between the tasks of interest. However, given that too few studies
explored more than one condition, we only described association
tendencies. To this end, we displayed control-patient differences
from each study in which at least two tasks where investigated,
among pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use and
mechanical problem solving (see Figure 4).
As can be seen, stronger positive associations were found
between pantomime of tool use, real tool use and mechanical
problem solving than between single tool use, real tool use and
mechanical problem solving. A negative association was observed
between single tool use and mechanical problem solving, but this
observation has to be taken with caution given that it concerned
only two studies. Interestingly, a slight impairment in mechanical
problem solving coincides with more substantial impairment in
pantomime of tool use than in real tool use. Furthermore, there
is a positive association between mechanical problem solving and
pantomime of tool use.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present paper was to provide an overview of tool
use impairments after left brain damage. More precisely, we shall
discuss the role of mechanical knowledge in tool use as well as the
cognitive mechanisms supporting pantomime of tool use.
THE ROLE OF MECHANICAL KNOWLEDGE IN TOOL USE
Three kinds of conceptual knowledge have been proposed to sup-
port real tool use: Semantic knowledge about tool function (Roy
and Square, 1985; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001), sensori-
motor knowledge about tool manipulation (Rothi et al., 1991;
Buxbaum, 2001) and mechanical knowledge about the physi-
cal properties of tools and objects (Goldenberg and Hagmann,
1998b; Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009; Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011).
We shall address these hypotheses in turn.
Semantic knowledge provides individuals with information
about the usual relationship between familiar tools and objects
(e.g., a hammer is usually used with a nail). Therefore, it might
be required in at least four situations: When matching pictures of
tools with the corresponding, usual object (e.g., hammer/nail) or
the context in which they can be used (e.g., hammer/workshop);
when it is necessary to select tools/objects to be used together;
when pantomiming the use of tools; and when performing single
tool use. Indeed, given that objects are not present in the two latter
situations, access to semantic knowledge is necessary to produce
the right conventional action (e.g., hammering is relevant with
a nail but not with a shoe). Interestingly, patients with semantic
dementia, who have lost semantic knowledge about tools, have
been demonstrated to perform better in no-choice situations and
mechanical problem solving, suggesting that these tasks put less
demands on functional knowledge (Hodges et al., 2000; Bozeat
et al., 2002; Silveri and Ciccarelli, 2009).
In our data, LBD patients perform better in real tool use (no
choice; mean control-patient difference 8%, range 0–16) than in
pantomime of tool use (25%, 6–52) and single tool use (17%, 0–
28). In other words, the more contextual information patients
receive, the better they perform. Presumably, this contextual
advantage may be a semantic advantage in that the presence of
objects in real tool use provides sufficient information and makes
retrieval from semantic memory unnecessary. Furthermore, the
choice condition of real tool use (18%, 9–28) is more difficult
than the no-choice condition of real tool use. These results are
consistent with the semantic hypothesis. Nevertheless, patients
still perform worse than controls in real tool use (no choice) and
mechanical problem solving (18%, 6–34). As a consequence, dis-
ruption of semantic knowledge accounts for some, but not all, of
tool use impairments. In other words, this kind of knowledge is
not sufficient to support tool use (see also Buxbaum et al., 1997).
Sensorimotor knowledge links specific movements to specific
tools (e.g., using a hammer requires ample elbow oscillations).
Three predictions can be derived from this hypothesis. First, this
kind of knowledge should be necessary in any task involving the
production of tool-related movements, among which are pan-
tomime of tool use, single tool use and real tool use. Second,
choice situations should not bemore difficult than no-choice situ-
ations because the same movement is required in both cases (e.g.,
hammering does not vary depending on the number of tools on
the desk). Third, the loss of sensorimotor knowledge should not
interfere in the use of novel tools, such as in mechanical problem
solving.
Our results do not confirm these predictions. Indeed, LBD
patients are not impaired to a similar extent in pantomime of tool
use (25%), single tool use (17%), and real tool use (no-choice,
8%). Moreover, the choice condition of real tool use is more diffi-
cult than the no-choice condition of real tool use even though this
dissociation has been assessed in only two studies (Heilman et al.,
1997; Jarry et al., 2013) and remains to be confirmed. At last, the
sensorimotor hypothesis does not account for impaired perfor-
mance of LBD patients in mechanical problem solving. On these
accounts, experimental data did not prove that apraxia of tool use
in LBD patients is due to the loss of sensorimotor knowledge.
Finally, mechanical knowledge about the physical properties
of tools and objects (e.g., hammering requires that the hammer is
heavier than the nail) may be necessary to use both familiar and
novel tools, and might be supported by the left inferior parietal
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FIGURE 3 | Differences (in percentages) between control subjects and LBD patients in real tool use (Choice and No-Choice) and mechanical problem
solving (Choice and No-Choice). Colored circles correspond to studies that investigated more than one condition. Circles in bold are non-significant differences.
Table 3 | Mean control-patient differences.
Mean control-patient Range
difference (%)
Pantomime of tool use 25 6–52
Single tool use 17 0–28
Mechanical problem solving (no choice) 15 6–26
Real tool use (no choice) 8 0–16
Mechanical problem solving (choice) 23 6–44
Real tool use (choice) 18 9–28
lobe (Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009). So, LBD patients are supposed
to be concurrently impaired in both of these tasks.
Overall, our results confirmed this prediction (real tool use,
mean control-patient difference 13%; mechanical problem solv-
ing: 18%). Moreover, LBD patients are constantly impaired in
mechanical problem solving and, in studies that investigated both
conditions, failure to solve mechanical problems was systemati-
cally associated with failure to use familiar tools (Heilman et al.,
1997; Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998b; Hartmann et al., 2005;
Bartolo et al., 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2007; Osiurak et al., 2009;
Jarry et al., 2013). Additionally, as shown in Figure 4, there is
a clear positive association between the two tasks. These results
lead us to suggest that mechanical knowledge is necessary to use
familiar tools and objects.
To conclude, experimental data obtained over the last 30 years
indicate that real tool use might be supported by at least two kinds
of knowledge, both of them referring to allocentric relationships:
Semantic knowledge about tool function and mechanical knowl-
edge. These two types of knowledge might partially compensate
for each other, in that studies on semantic dementia already
described impaired use of familiar tools in the context of pre-
served mechanical problem solving (Hodges et al., 2000; Bozeat
et al., 2002; Silveri and Ciccarelli, 2009). However, to our knowl-
edge, this pattern has never been found in LBD patients. On the
other hand, the reverse pattern (i.e., impaired, but better perfor-
mance in real tool use than in mechanical problem solving; see
Table 1) was frequently observed, suggesting that loss of mechan-
ical knowledge can be partially compensated by intact semantic
knowledge although it is critical to account for tool use disor-
ders in LBD patients. We shall now discuss the cognitive processes
underlying pantomime of tool use.
THE COGNITIVE PROCESSES SUPPORTING PANTOMIME OF TOOL USE
Three hypotheses have been proposed to explain the cognitive
basis of pantomime of tool use: The sensorimotor knowledge
hypothesis (Heilman et al., 1982; Buxbaum et al., 2005), the
symbolic hypothesis (Goldenberg et al., 2003) and the working
memory hypothesis (Roy and Hall, 1992; Bartolo et al., 2003).
According to the sensorimotor knowledge hypothesis, pan-
tomime of tool use requires individuals to implicitly recover
gesture representations that contain invariant, egocentric rela-
tionships, and that are specific to particular tools. Therefore,
as suggested above, there should be no difference between
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FIGURE 4 | Associations between pantomime of tool use and single
tool use, real tool use, and mechanical problem solving (left panel)
and between mechanical problem solving and pantomime of tool
use, single tool use and real tool use (right panel). Each point
corresponds to control-patient differences. Slopes illustrate the degree
of association.
pantomime of tool use, single tool use and real tool use. Indeed,
because these representations are egocentric and invariant, the
presence/absence of tools and objects should not modify control-
patient differences. However, the present review confirmed that
pantomime of tool use is much more difficult than real tool use
(see also Riddoch et al., 1989; Roy and Hall, 1992; Butler, 2002;
Bartolo et al., 2003; Bickerton et al., 2012). Moreover, pantomime
of tool use seems to be poorly associated with single tool use com-
pared with real tool use and even mechanical problem solving
(see Figure 4). These results thus do not favor the sensorimotor
knowledge hypothesis.
The symbolic hypothesis assumes that defective pantomime
of tool use is due to asymbolia, that is, a “general inability to
express concepts by means of learned signs” (Goldenberg et al.,
2003). As an example, drawing from memory implies to select
typical features of the object to be drawn (e.g., the shape of
both the handle and head of a hammer). Presumably, asymbolia
should impair any activity that requires access to semantic mem-
ory, such as language, drawing from memory and pantomime of
tool use (see Goldenberg, 2013b). Indeed, this hypothesis also
presumes that pantomimes are part of communicative gestures
in that they require patients to select distinctive features of the
sensory appearance of absent tools/objects (e.g., the shape of the
handle of a hammer) and to abstract properties that do not con-
tribute to recognizability (e.g., the color or the material of the
handle) in order to produce a canonical, recognizable gesture.
So, pantomime of tool use should be more difficult than single
tool use since in the latter, patients do not need to communi-
cate the idea of the tool because they already handle it. Our data
are consistent with this hypothesis: Pantomime of tool use (mean
control-patient difference 25%) and single tool use (17%) appear
to be weakly associated and the first is consistently more difficult
than the latter over studies. Nevertheless, pantomime of tool use is
closer to mechanical problem solving than to single tool use (see
Table 3, Figures 3, 4) and in previous studies, asymbolia alone
could not account for pantomime disturbances in LBD patients
(Goldenberg et al., 2003). Further research is thus required on
this point.
In line with the working memory hypothesis, pantomiming
the use of tools leads individuals to form a mental representa-
tion of the tool in hand, the object on the desk and the action
to be performed. Once this layout has been imagined, it has to
be maintained in working memory until the gesture is finished.
This implies that holding a tool in hand and/or seeing the object
provides cues, hence reducing the degrees of freedom and so the
number of possible errors (Roy and Hall, 1992; Bartolo et al.,
2003). As a consequence, the presence of actual tools reduces
the load on working memory and enhances performance. The
gradient we already described is consistent with this hypothesis.
To sum up, the present review found the working memory
hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, the symbolic hypothesis, to
be most relevant as regards pantomime of tool use. On the
other hand, the sensorimotor knowledge hypothesis remains to
be demonstrated. Another key finding is the similar difficulty level
and the relationship between mechanical problem solving and
pantomime of tool use (see Table 3 and Figure 4). Previous stud-
ies reported significant correlations between these tasks (Heilman
et al., 1997; Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998b; Jarry et al., 2013).
This finding is not compatible with cognitive models of apraxia
(Roy and Square, 1985; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001) but
rather suggests that pantomime of tool use is a composite task
that may call for mechanical knowledge, in addition with seman-
tic knowledge and working memory. In fact, this task can be
viewed as a kind of problem solving for it may require forming
a mental representation through identification and combination
of distinctive features of tools and actions (see Goldenberg et al.,
2003; Goldenberg, 2009) or, put differently, technical means and
technical ends (Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011).
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Table 4 | Cognitive demands depending on the task.
Pantomime of Single Real tool Mechanical
tool use tool use use problem
solving
Semantic knowledge
about tool function + + + −
and context
Mechanical knowledge
about physical properties + + + ++
of tools/objects
Working memory ++ + − −
Production system + + + +
++High demands on the cognitive process.
+Moderate demands.
−Low or absent demands.
Before concluding, let us discuss results indicating differences
between choice and no choice conditions. On the whole, the pres-
ence of numerous tools seems to be a major obstacle to LBD
patients but not to control subjects. Note that although this find-
ing is intuitive, the cognitive models of apraxia (Roy and Square,
1985; Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001) do not address the issue
of how humans choose tools and objects. Interestingly, the choice
effect is true for familiar as well as novel tools and, as a result,
questions the relationship between mechanical knowledge and
tool substitutions. Unfortunately, only one of the selected stud-
ies investigated real tool use (choice) without distractors (Neiman
et al., 2000). Consequently, it remains unknown whether LBD
patients fail multiple object tasks because of a planning impair-
ment, interference from distractors or inability to select and
combine useful/useless tools. Nevertheless, these results remain to
be confirmed because ceiling effects prevented us from comput-
ing the real difference between choice and no-choice conditions in
control group. Therefore, such a difference among patients could
be accounted for by the intrinsic difficulty of choice conditions.
Future research is needed to disentangle the origin of the choice
effect in LBD patients.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use
and mechanical problem solving seem to have at least one cogni-
tive mechanism in common, which may be the ability to retrieve
mechanical knowledge on the basis of identification and combi-
nation of distinctive features of tools and objects. Nevertheless,
each task calls for differential demands depending on pres-
ence/absence, familiarity/novelty and number of tools/objects
(see Table 4). This theoretical distribution challenges the idea that
tool use in general, and pantomime of tool use in particular call
for sensorimotor knowledge. Note also that data reported here
focus on left brain damage but do not exclude a role of the right
hemisphere in tool use (Schwartz et al., 1999; Hartmann et al.,
2005; Rumiati, 2005). In sum, although apraxia of tool use is clas-
sically viewed as a disorder of movement representations/motor
control, the present review emphasizes that apraxia of tool use
in LBD patients may be first and foremost a cognitive disorder
involving the understanding of how tools and objects have to be
used together (Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011; Goldenberg, 2013a).
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